The Paradoxes of History and Memory in Post-Colonial Sierra Leone by unknow

Author:unknow
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 1481214
Publisher: Lexington Books

The Impact of a Weakened Structural Model

Since the establishment of the Battalion, significant structural drawbacks made it difficult to achieve organizational efficiency. Commenting on the performance of the Battalion in the Cameroons campaigns, Brigadier J.J. Moberly argued that it was commendable but not exceptional.49 On the eve of World War II, the Battalion was lagging behind in “standards,” efficiency,” and, above all, “organization,” leading the Inspector General to consider it “unfit for war.” Added to these drawbacks, the range of equipment regularly borne by recruits was reputedly “cumbersome” and “excessive.” Of even graver concern before 1939-45 was the lack of anti-gas equipment; so was the practice of denying the Sierra Leone soldier boots, which rendered the replacement of the chupplie necessary. On the eve of World War II, the condition of the rifles and bayonets were in a worn-out state, principally due to the difficulties of fulfilling indents in the United Kingdom for weapons and small arms ammunition. Such difficulties generated administrative complications which hampered the accumulation of reserves of small arms ammunition on the scale specified by the Overseas Defence Committee and adversely affected the Battalion’s efficiency. Thus did the Inspector General conclude that “the organization … is unsound and in consequence, the training has suffered … and the Battalion is unfit for war.”50

By 1939, the structural weaknesses evident in the imperial model had taken their toll on one distinct segment of Sierra Leone society—the Krio—purveyors of Western education, not only in the dependency but stretching all along the West African coast to Angola.51 Miffed by the refusal of the authorities to respond to their clamor for enlistment and precluded from the profession by a rule against the wearing of boots, Krio aspirations for enlistment had been firmly dented by the time of Gunner Cole’s mutiny in January, 1939.52 The distorted notions held by the British about African recruits, the rather half-hearted commitment to training Sierra Leoneans as officers since 1902, the strict conditions prescribed for entry into Sandhurst Military Academy or Mons—which precluded the cultivation of a proper Sandhurst or Mons officer breed by the dawn of independence—all combined to produce a makeshift structure that hardly suited the needs of independent Sierra Leone. Consequently, the rapid promotion of Sierra Leoneans in the immediate post-independence period helped to produce a distinctively destabilizing effect on the organization. Furthermore, the subsequent substantial closeness in age and the duration of service between the most senior indigenous officers, and the group of substantially younger and probably better educated and trained officers all helped to erode the cohesion and corporate identity of the Sierra Leone Army and enhanced its vulnerability to “outside” influences. As Sierra Leone inherited the recruitment patterns laid down by the British, this ensured the persistence and preservation of the colonial heritage. The army’s organizational format comprised the colonial infantry battalion as the basic unit, the language of command, internal regulations, terminology, and rank structure, all of which had little in common with the pre-colonial heritage of Sierra Leone society while also precluding any possibility for change.

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